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CURRENT LEGISLATION
ance used as a means of transportation on land propelled by a motor.'8
A horse-drawvn vehicle is excluded; although a trolley car or railroad
train may be classified as motor vehicles the requirement that the
vehicle must have been operated upon the highways of the state,
excludes their being considered as such.14 Except for the fact that
this last condition was intended to exclude trolley cars and railroad
trains, it seems to serve no valid purpose in alleviating the evil sought
to be corrected. Suppose the accident takes place on a private street
as distinguished from a public highway, the evil which existed where
a public highway is concerned exists here, yet by express provision the
amendment is inapplicable.
After all the conditions above set forth have been complied with
testimony as to the facts of the accident are admitted but testimony as
to a conversation with the deceased is still incompetent.' 5 The statute
somewhat alleviates the situation but its limitations are unduly nar-
rowed by the wording of the Act. If the courts interpret the statute
in the light of the evil sought to be prevented and give a liberal con-
struction to its limitations the Act is a definite step forward. If, on
the other hand, the Act is to be strictly construed, many evils sought
to be prevented will not be eliminated.
BENJAmIN LIEBOV.
ATTORNEYS ExEMPT FROM FILING CERTIFICATE OF PARTNER-
SHi.-The state, by virtue of its police power, may regulate its inter-
nal affairs for the protection and promotion of the general welfare.'
Exercising this regulatory power the New York Legislature enacted
in 1939 a mandatory direction requiring all persons conducting busi-
ness as partners to file with the county clerk a certificate containing
the name of the partnership and the names and addresses of all the
partners. 2 The purpose of this statute was for the general conve-
13 BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) 1801 ("VEHICLE. Any carriage,
conveyance, or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a
means of transportation on land ;-not ordinarily including locomotives, cars,
and street cars which run and are operated only over and upon permanent track
or fixed way, unless the contest of the ordinance or statute in question clearly
indicates an intention to the contrary").
:4 Ibid.
25 The statute expressly provides that "this provision shall not be construed
as permitting testimony as to conversations with the deceased".
2 Halter v. State of Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 27 Sup. Ct. 419 (1907).
2 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 440-b: "1. No person shall hereafter carry on or
conduct or transact business in this state as partners under a partnership agree-
ment unless such persons shall file -in the office of the clerk of the county or
counties in which the partnership business shall be conducted or transacted, a
certificate setting forth the name under which such business is, or is to be,
conducted or transacted, the true or real full names of all the persons conducting
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nience of third parties who contracted with the firm and then sought
to enforce such contractual obligation incurred by the partnership
under the firm name. That name, when used in executing a contract,
is* intended to bind the partnership and its members; - and it is neces-
sary when suing on such contract that all the partners be made parties
defendant. 4 Difficulty would arise where only the firm name had been
used and the names of the pairtners were not disclosed, except that of
the partner who was acting as agent for the partnership. The task is
equally as onerous in actions based on tort where the plaintiff seeks to
hold the partners jointly liable.5 The difficulty existed whether a
fictitious name was used or an incomplete designation by true name.
The task of the one seeking relief has been alleviated by the passage
of the statute requiring all partnerships to record the name of the firm
and the names of all the individual partners. 6 Prior to the enactment
of that statute, there existed an act which required only the filing of
assumed names.7
Partnerships are classified into two divisions, trading or commer-
cial partnerships and nontrading or noncommercial partnerships. In
the case of a commercial or trading partnership (one engaged in a
business of buying and selling for profit), each partner acts as a gen-
eral agent with implied authority to make contracts and incur obliga-
tions which will bind all the partners, if within the scope of the part-
nership business.8 In the case of a noncommercial or nontrading
partnership (engaged in business other than buying and selling for
profit), however, the doctrine of general agency and implied liability
does not apply, and a partner does not generally possess power to act
for and bind the firm and the other partners.9 A partner in a non-
trading partnership has no authority to execute a note in the firm name
which is binding on the other partners.10 So a partner in the prac-
tice of medicine or surgery," or law,' 2 is not a member of a commer-
cial partnership, and has not the implied authority of a general agent.
or transacting such partnership, with the residence and business addresses of
such persons, and the age of any who may be infants. Such certificate shall be
executed and duly acknowledged by all persons entering into such partnership
agreement."
3 1 ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1912) 281.
4 N. Y. PART. LAW § 26.
5 Hyde v. Lesser, 93 App. Div. 320, 87 N. Y. Supp. 878 (1st Dept. 1904);
Wood v. Proudman, 122 App. Div. 826, 107 N. Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dept. 1907);
Maxwell v. Martin, 130 App. Div. 80, 114 N. Y. Supp. 349 (1st Dept. 1909).
6 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 440-b.
7 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 440.847 C. J. (1929) §291.
9 Pease v. Cole, 53 Conn. 53, 22 Atl. 681 (1885) ; American Bonding Co. v.
Fults, 157 Mo. A. 553, 138 S. W. 689 (1911); Ann Arbor First Nat. Bank v.
Farson, 226 N. Y. 218, 123 N. E. 490 (1919); Snively v. Matheson, 12 Wash.
88, 40 Pac. 628 (1895).
10 Eastlick v. Hayward Lumber & Investment Co., 33 Ariz. 242, 263 Pac.
936 (1928).
11 Crosthwait v. Ross, 1 Humph. 23 (Tenn. 1839).
12 Worster v. Forbush, 171 Mass. 423, 50 N. E. 936 (1898).
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The statute, requiring the filing of certificates of partnership, imposed
this prerequisite on persons carrying on a business as partners without
qualifications as to the type of copartnership. The question presented
itself as to whether this statute applied to nontrading partnerships or
to partners who are engaged in the practice of a profession. Upon
being confronted with a similar problem under a fictitious name stat-
ute, a Michigan court held that a partnership of attorneys, engaged
exclusively in the practice of their profession, was not exempi from
the provisions of the statute on the ground that the practice of law is a
"profession", and not a "business" within the meaning of the Act.13
The court said: "Nothing in the act suggests its limitation to those
capitalized copartnerships organized for trade, manufacturing, or
commerce, to the exemption of that numerous class of nontrading
partnerships in occupation or employment, the capital of which con-
sists chiefly of especial skill, experience, and learning in a particular
calling * * *. That the act does not, by express language or by
implication, except attorneys from provisions, is clear." 14 If any
doubt existed as to what partnerships were intended to be included
under the New York filing statute, it was cleared up by the subse-
quent passage by the legislature of an amendment which excepted
partnerships of attorneys from filing.15 From this may be inferred
the legislative intent that both trading and nontrading partnerships
file, the only exception being nontrading partnerships of attorneys, and
that by special provision. The legislature probably was of the opinion
that attorneys are subject to sufficient scrutiny when they are made to
comply with the standard of qualification as set by the courts, with its
auxiliary board of examiners, which has the duty of examination and
determination and that further regulation as to attorneys as partners
would put an undue burden on them. The legislature may, for the
same reason, grant such exemption to physicians and accountants. It
is for the legislature, not for the courts, to say whether there should be
any exceptions to the provisions of such statute.16
Under common law a partnership was not restricted in its right
to do business within a state.7 STince the transaction of business
through partnerships is a rather popular practice the various states
have found it necessary to enact regulatory statutes for the protection
of the public. In exercising their police power to safeguard the public
interests through imposing conditions on the right to engage in a
business as partners, the states did not require compliance with con-
ditions having no reasonable relation to that objective. Many states
required that only partnerships having fictitious names should file so
'3 Sloman v. Bender, 189 Mich. 258, 155 N. W. 581 (1915).
14 Ibid.
Is N. Y. PENAL LAW § 440-b, subd. 6 (subd. 6 as first set out Was added
by L. 1940, c. 512, in effect April 15, 1940 and it has no reference to the follow-
ing subdivision which is also numbered subd. 6).
16 Sloman v. Bender, 189 Mich. 258, 155 N. W. 581 (1915).
17 State v. U. S. Exp. Co., 81 Minn. 87, 83 N. W. 465 (1900).
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that the public may have ready means of information as to the per-
sonal or financial responsibility behind the fictitious name.' 8 Some
state statutes provide that a partnership may not maintain an action
on a contract if it has not complied with the filing statute.19 These
statutes do not apply to tort actions.20 In some states there exist
statutes requiring that only trading partnerships shall record. 21  The
New York Legislature has exercised the widest power in requiring all
partnerships to file with the county clerk a certificate setting forth the
partnership name and the names and addresses of all the individual
partners.22
The legislature evidently found that the "fictitious name filing
statute" did not render sufficient protection to persons dealing with
partnerships since many partnerships have true names which are
incomplete designations. By requiring all partnerships to file an
opportunity is given to a person, contracting with the partnership, to
determine exactly with whom he is dealing. If one desires to bring
an ex delicto action against a trading or nontrading partnership, he
may sue the partners jointly or severally. 23 The filing statute pro-
tects this choice given the plaintiff by making it rather simple to deter-
mine who the partners are if the plaintiff wants to sue the partners
jointly. The statute is not unconstitutional as forbidding the trans-
action of busines. 24  It merely requires filing and provides a proper
penalty for any violation thereof. Although not a creature of the
state, as is a corporation, a partnership has become subject to much
state regulation in recent years in an effort to prevent any evils which
may arise *when two or more persons associate for the purpose of
transacting business.
CATHERINE GREENFIELD.
THE SELECTIVE SERVICE AND TRAINING ACT OF 1940.-Con-
gress, exercising the power vested in it by the Federal Constitution,'
recently passed the first peacetime statute conscripting the nation's
is 45 A. L. R. 203 (1926).
ig Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo. 233, 110 Pac. 181 (1910) ; Ryder-Gouger Co.
v. Garretson, 53 Wash. 71, 101 Pac. 498 (1909); Church v. Wilkeson-Tripp Co.,
58 Wash. 262, 108 Pac. 596 (1910).
20 Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo. 233, 110 Pac. 181 (1910).
212 ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1912) 1237.
22 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 440-b.
23 N. Y. PART. LAW § 26.
24 Kusnetzky v. Security Ins. Co., 313 Mo. 143, 281 S. W. 47 (1926).
1 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have the power . . . to
declare war .. . to raise and support armies, . . . to make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces; . . . to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying- into execution the foregoing
powers").
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